THE FUTURE OF ASEAN :
TOWARDS A SECURITY COMMUNITY
Rizal SUKMA CSIS, Jakarta
Paper presented at A Seminar on " ASEAN Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects in the Current l11ternational
Situation"
New York, 3 June 2003
1. Frustration and criticisms regarding the role and efficacy of ASEAN are not new. Indeed, talks about the declining role of ASEAN -both in terms of intra-mural cooperation and extra-mural relations-had proliferated since the end of the Cold War. As the region was swept by fll1ancial crisis in 1997, such criticisms grew even stronger and louder. 2. In the view of many both within and outside ASEAN, the organization has become incapacitated by tremendous difficulties posed by several developments. The first is the hasty expansion of membership that covers all 10 regional countries. The second development is fundamental political and economic changes in some key member countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Finally, there are those who also argue that ASEAN became crippled due to the collapse of Indonesia's leadership within the organization. In short, ASEAN has lost the diplomatic centrality it had enjoyed during the most part of 1980s and early 1990s. 3. As the world enters the Age of Tenor since September 11, ASEAN is once again posed with tremendous challenge to prove itself as an organization not only worthy of its existence but also relevance. The strategic environment -if not the world-- within with ASEAN operates has changed significantly, if not fundamentally. So have the challenges it faces. To embrace the new world, and to address new challenges, ASEAN has no choice but to rethink itself. A new world requires new thinking, and therefore ASEAN should courageously move away from its conservatism. It should take bold initiatives to renew itself. 4. The corning 9th ASEAN Summit provides a timely opportunity for Indonesia to contribute to that process. Indonesia should use the opportunity to reclaim its " strategic centrality" within ASEAN which, in turn, would enable the Association to reclaim its " diplomatic centrality" within the international community. To fulfill such agenda, ASEAN should start with itself. It should embark upon a new course for the future. However, such imperative should not be divorced from ASEAN own experience over the last 35 years of its existence. Where ASEAN is now can not be achieved if not for what has been set out by the Association since 1967. 5. For that purpose, ASEAN needs a new political and security blueprint for itself. It should undertake a strategic pause, go back to basic and reflect upon what it aspired to in 1967 and, from there, chart a new course for the future. In short, ASEAN needs to reset itself and start anew, but without ignoring the tensions between the desirable and the possible. This concept paper will not provide a comprehensive assessment of where ASEAN is now and what it has achieved so far. It is meant as a proposal for a blue-print that could be used as a road- map on where ASEAN politicalsecurity cooperation should be headi11g in the future. 6. In that context, h1donesia might want to encourage its fellow ASEAN members to revisit the Association's rationale, redefine its principles, refine its decision-making mechanism and the modalities of intra- mural cooperation, and accelerate the institution-building process. Only then can ASEAN move forward to meet the challenges of the 21st century . Revisiting the Rationale: The Relevance of ” ASEAN Security Community ” 1. When ASEAN was formed in August 1967, the need to cooperate in political and security area was conspicuously absence in the founding document of the Association (The Bangkok Declaration). While it set out the task of promoting "regional peace and stability" and strengthening " the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations," the Bangkok Declaration clearly reflects the believe in "the economic road towards peace." Indeed, cooperation was only deemed necessary on "matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields." 2. As normative values, the quest for "peace, stability, and prosperity" will continue to be relevance as the main rationale for ASEAN's existence. For more than three decades, it has functioned well as the platform for the pursuit of intra-mural cooperation within a specific historical context. Changes in the strategic environment, and its attendant implications for regional security and domestic priorities, make it imperative for ASEAN to also acknowledge the importance of " security road towards peace." ASEAN can no longer pretend that " peace, stability , and prosperity" can only be achieved through economic cooperation. 3. The recognition of the importance of "security road towards peace, stability and prosperity" should now be incorporated formally into ASEAN rationale. True, ASEAN has never i1nended to transform itself into a defense community based on a collective defense approach to security. It is also true that ASEAN has never aspired to become an organization shaped by a collective security approach. In fact, for more than three decades, ASEAN has always avoided the need to define its objective beyond normative and abstract terms. If ASEAN wants to have a meaningful political and security cooperation, it needs to define the end condition that it wants to achieve in a more concrete form. In other words, ASEAN needs to agree on what it wants itself to evolve into and how to achieve it. 4. For that purpose, Indonesia should propose that ASEAN evolves into a "Security Community" within the next 20 years or so. The ideal of "peace and stability" embedded in the Bangkok Declaration needs operational and functional meaning. ASEAN can no longer be allowed to "float" without a sense of purpose; without a practical goal that needs to be achieve, without a future condition that needs to be realized. The idea of ASEAN Security Community is meant to provide such a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for. 5. This proposal will complement the proposal by Singapore that ASEAN evolves into an Economic Community by 2020. In the long term, a sustai11able economic community can only be guaranteed by the creation of a security community .Vice versa, a security community will not last without a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic community. In other words, the notion of an economic commw1ity and a security community is mutually reinforcing. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN Community, in which economic integration and cooperative security are essentially linked, is not impossible to achieve. A. The Concept: Characteristics and the Reality of Contemporary ASEAN 1. The concept of Security Community is often defined as a group of states that has achieved a condition, as a result of flow of communication and the habit of cooperation, where members share "expectations of peaceful change" and rule out "the use of force as a means of problem solving." States that belong to a Security Community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to other states and then- destiny bound by common norms, history, political experience, and regional location. A Security Community exists when states reach the level of confidence that security can only be attained if they cooperate with each other. It is a regional grouping that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra- regional conflicts. 2. Facilitated by high levels of political and economic interdependence, states within a Security Community come to build the "habit of trust" in managing their intra-mural affairs. A Security Community is also characterized by (a) the absence of a competitive military build-up among the regional actors, (b) total absence of armed inter-state conflict, (c) the presence of formal and informal n1stitutions and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and disorder, (d) high degree of economic n1tegration, and (e) the absence of territorial dispute among member states. Unlike a "Security Regime," where the renouncement of the threat or use of force "is still inhibited by the existence of a balance of power or mutual deterrence situation," a Security Community is based on " a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors in the avoidance of war ." 3. ASEAN, despite the potentials generated by the habit of cooperation over 35 years, is yet to develop into a fullpledged Security Community .Even though member states have renounced the threat or use of force as a means of resolving conflict among themselves, it is still a Security Regime. At this stage, the renounciation of the use of threat still a declaration of intent rather an objective condition- The transformation of ASEAN into a security community would require not only the absence of war but also the absence of the prospect of war. 4. If managed consciously, however, ASEAN could n1 fact develop, not into a pluralistic Security Community in a Deutschian sense, but into a comprehensive Security Community more attuned to the region's own needs and characteristics. While Deutschian concept of Security Community is based only on the notion of security in military terms, ASEAN stands a much better prospect to become a Security Community in a comprehensive sense: a Comprehensive Security Community that incorporates, and attach an equal importance to, elements of non-military security. It is also important to stress that a Security Community is not a Defense Pact or a military alliance. Security Community does not prescribe member states to commit their resources in defense of a member state in the event of a military attack from external actor. It seeks the creation of a conducive and cooperative environment within which conflict would not occur ill the first place. Even in the case of dispute, an ASEAN Security Community would provide a framework within which disputes can be prevented, managed, and resolved peacefully through other means than the military one. 5. Indeed, ASEAN is well placed to strive for the realization of such regional security community vision in the future. It already possesses elements of all the characteristics of a Security Community mentioned above. In fact, there have been formal and informal institutions and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, and manage col1flicts within ASEAN. In order to become a Security Community , in the future ASEAN only needs to strengthen its capability to prevent and resolve conflicts and disorder. Moreover, the basis for a deep economic integration is already provided for in the plan to create an ASEAN Economic Community .If the vision for an ASEAN Economic Community can be achieved within the agreed time-frame, there is strong reason to believe that an ASEAN Security Community is also more in the area of the possible rather than in the area of the probable. B. Principles and Instruments An " ASEAN Security Community" does not necessarily resemble that of the Security Community envisaged by North Atlantic countries. It is, after all, an ASEAN Security Community. Therefore, the idea for an ASEAN Security Community needs to be based on a set of principles sensitive to, and cognizant of, (a) historical and contemporary reality of the region, (b) aspirations and condition of member states, and (c) the strategic context within which ASEAN faces its own security challenges. The current principles embedded in ASEAN already provide the basis for such a Security Community. However, those principles also need to be adjusted to the current reality so that they will meet new challenges and requirements. Principle of Non-Interference. This principle should continue to become the main feature of an ASEAN Security Community .However, the governments of ASEAN countries should employ the principle in a flexible way. They should be: (1) more open to greater and cooperative involvement of other member states -through an agreed mechanism-- in trans-boundaries issues (internal issues with clear regional implications) and issues with identifiable humanitarian dimension (such as gross violations of human rights and in the event of humanitarian crisis); (2) more open to friendly advise offered by fellow member state, provided such advise is regulated and channeled through appropriate mechanism; and (3) less reactive to voices of civil society of other member states. Respect for National Sovereignty. An ASEAN Security Community will continue to place national sovereignty of member states as the highest principle that regulates intra-mural relations. Again, such as in the case of non-interference, sovereignty should be exercised in an appropriate way. Member countries should be allowed to develop a mechanism through which ASEAN countries, as an institution, could assist member state (s) in internal issues with clear external implications. The ability to work together to prevent seeds of conflict from becoming open and violent conflict, for example, should be improved. It is also equally important that ASEAN develops the capacity to undertake a peace-keeping role in internal conflict, provided such a role is based on the cosent by state concerned. Consensus-based Decision-Making. This principle, as ASEAN has demonstrated for more than three decades, proved to be a wise approach to decision-making. As effectiveness is increasingly becoming the main challenge for ASEAN, the use of this principle should be made selective. On issues of paramount important to the Association, such as membership, decision-making should continue to be based on this principle. ASEAN should begin delineate when consensus should be evoked, and when flexibility i11 decision-making could be allowed. The formula of ASEAN-X can be the basis of this mode of decision-making in the field of security cooperation. The " Anti- Terror Pact" between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, which Vietnam and Cambodia later joined, is an example of this. The Renouncement of the Threat or Use of Force. This principle, already included in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (T AC), should serve as the foundation for ASEAN Security Community. Disputes and conflicts among member states should be resolved through peaceful means. For this principle to become an embedded element intra-ASEAN relations, not just a declaration of intent, ASEAN should consciously work to transform its current status as a " conflict management" institution into a " conflict resolution" one. The Importance of Comprehensive Security. ASEAN, despite all the rhetoric, remains an inter-governmental form of cooperation among regional states. As such, the emphasis on "state security" over "human security" remains visible. An ASEAN with a state-centric paradigm will not be able to regain its relevance. An ASEAN Security Community should balance its concern over state security with a greater emphasis on "human security" and more room for people-to-people interaction. ASEAN's long subscription to the principle of comprehensive security , which conceives security beyond its military dimension, clearly provides the basis for this. For an ASEAN Security Community , security should encompass every aspects of life. The realization of An ASEAN Security Community can also rely on the existing instruments. The TAC, for example, already provides the basis for (a) the renouncement of war and the use of forces and (b) the mechanism to resolve conflict. The AFT A provides the basis for deeper economic integration, and this will be more so if ASEAN adopts a plan to transform itself into an ASEAN Economic Community .Meanwhile, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord provides the basis for a shared identity among member states. C. Areas of Cooperation In the long terms, an ASEAN Security Community should be a community capable of managing, countering and defeating threats to regional security and stability .Each member state should be able to cope with such threats at national level, and has the capacity and willingness to contribute to a common efforts at regional level. This requires member states to deepen and expand areas of political and security cooperation, both in traditional and non-traditional areas. Specifically, there are two areas that need special attention. First, there is a need for ASEAN to strengthen security and defense cooperation among member states. For example, ASEAN needs to strengthen the mechanism and capability to conduct a joint patrol and surveillance. Second, there is also a need to develop a capacity to assist member states in dealing with internal conflicts, especially in ensuring peace and in undertaking post-conflict reconstruction. An improvement in the ability to undertake peace-keeping operations is imperative. In the short and medium terms, especially in light of post-September 11 security challenges, ASEAN needs to deepen cooperation in political and security fields, especially in addressing non-traditional threats. In this regard, the need to tackle the growing threat of terrorism -in domestic, regional and global context-should be given a high priority by member states, especially those directly affected by the threat of terrorism. The initiative to combat terrorism should be undertaken in a comprehensive way which incorporates the need to protect both state and human security. D. Institution-Building An ASEAN Security Community needs a more integrated institution. Here, there is a need for ASEAN to wider the participation of defense establishments in its activities. An informal ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) could also be considered. Exchange of views between foreign ministers and defense ministers on issues of common concerns should be encouraged. As it views security in comprehensive terms, ASEAN machiI1ery should reflect that notion. Cooperation in combating terrorism should be made central in ASEAN cooperation in addressing non-traditional threats. To achieve this, ASEAN should not approach terrorism as one part of larger transnational security issues. It should approach the problem in its own rights, together with other problems that facilitate acts of terrorism. In other words, problems such as small-arms trafficking, frauds and fake documents, illegal immigrants, and money laundering, should be tackled as parts of the overall efforts to combat terrorism. In this area of combating terrorism, the implementation of the agreement to improve institutional capacitybuilding among the member states has been slow. Moreover, the Yangon meeting has not detailed how the coordination and relationship between AMMTC and SOMTC and other relevant institutions should be undertaken. Here, ASEAN has decided to undertake a "two-pronged strategy" in combating terrorism: cooperation within an ASEAN framework and cooperation among ASEAN member states under the formula of " ASEAN-X." In practical term, the iI1itiative and cooperation in combating terrorism needs greater focus and coordination. Therefore, ASEAN should consider the establishment of an ASEAN Centre for Combating Terrorism, and urges its member states to ratify all relevant international conventions in this area. This later point is important due to the fact that there is a difficulty in harmonizing legal instruments in any ASEAN agreement to combat terrorism and other trans-national crimes. In order to improve its conflict prevention and conflict resolution capacity, ASEAN also needs to establish Peace- Keeping Training Centre . Such a centre could provide ASEAN member states a new vehicle to forge a more institutionalised mechanism for confidence-building measures (CBMS). In responding to growing trans-national threats and challenges, especially those with maritime dimension, an ASEAN Maritime Surveillance Centre might be needed. E. Platform for Security Cooperation: Towards A New Constitutional Framework All ideas raised above will not become a reality unless it is incorporated into a binding document that serves as a new road-map for ASEAN cooperation in political and security field. For that purpose, ASEAN should issue a new political and security platform, say a Bali Declaration on ASEAN Security Community, that i11corporates the following elements: a. a vision for an ASEAN Security Community b. commitment by ASEAN states to develop a security community by 2020, c. an agreement to request Indonesia, as Chairman of Standing Committee, to draft An ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action or ASEAN Comprehensive Regional Security Plan, to be submitted at the l0th ASEAN Summit. d. The needs for a new platform for political and security cooperation which combi11e relevant aspects of ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANWFZ with new ones. Summary: Recommendations for Indonesia's Government in Preparation for the 9th ASEAN Summit I. Propose the idea of ASEAN Security Comn1unity by 2020, 2. Propose to i11tegrate the existing ASEAN pri11ciples as the basis for an ASEAN Security Community , 3. Propose the adoption of a new ASEAN Community constitution, be it in the form of a new declaration such as Bali Declaration on ASEAN Security Community or an ASEAN Declaration on Comprehensive Security Cooperation, 4. Endorse the proposal for an ASEAN Centre for Combating Terrorism, ASEAN Peace Keeping Trai11i11g Centre, and ASEAN Maritime Surveillance Centre
1. Frustration and criticisms regarding the role and efficacy of ASEAN are not new. Indeed, talks about the declining role of ASEAN -both in terms of intra-mural cooperation and extra-mural relations-had proliferated since the end of the Cold War. As the region was swept by fll1ancial crisis in 1997, such criticisms grew even stronger and louder. 2. In the view of many both within and outside ASEAN, the organization has become incapacitated by tremendous difficulties posed by several developments. The first is the hasty expansion of membership that covers all 10 regional countries. The second development is fundamental political and economic changes in some key member countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Finally, there are those who also argue that ASEAN became crippled due to the collapse of Indonesia's leadership within the organization. In short, ASEAN has lost the diplomatic centrality it had enjoyed during the most part of 1980s and early 1990s. 3. As the world enters the Age of Tenor since September 11, ASEAN is once again posed with tremendous challenge to prove itself as an organization not only worthy of its existence but also relevance. The strategic environment -if not the world-- within with ASEAN operates has changed significantly, if not fundamentally. So have the challenges it faces. To embrace the new world, and to address new challenges, ASEAN has no choice but to rethink itself. A new world requires new thinking, and therefore ASEAN should courageously move away from its conservatism. It should take bold initiatives to renew itself. 4. The corning 9th ASEAN Summit provides a timely opportunity for Indonesia to contribute to that process. Indonesia should use the opportunity to reclaim its " strategic centrality" within ASEAN which, in turn, would enable the Association to reclaim its " diplomatic centrality" within the international community. To fulfill such agenda, ASEAN should start with itself. It should embark upon a new course for the future. However, such imperative should not be divorced from ASEAN own experience over the last 35 years of its existence. Where ASEAN is now can not be achieved if not for what has been set out by the Association since 1967. 5. For that purpose, ASEAN needs a new political and security blueprint for itself. It should undertake a strategic pause, go back to basic and reflect upon what it aspired to in 1967 and, from there, chart a new course for the future. In short, ASEAN needs to reset itself and start anew, but without ignoring the tensions between the desirable and the possible. This concept paper will not provide a comprehensive assessment of where ASEAN is now and what it has achieved so far. It is meant as a proposal for a blue-print that could be used as a road- map on where ASEAN politicalsecurity cooperation should be headi11g in the future. 6. In that context, h1donesia might want to encourage its fellow ASEAN members to revisit the Association's rationale, redefine its principles, refine its decision-making mechanism and the modalities of intra- mural cooperation, and accelerate the institution-building process. Only then can ASEAN move forward to meet the challenges of the 21st century . Revisiting the Rationale: The Relevance of ” ASEAN Security Community ” 1. When ASEAN was formed in August 1967, the need to cooperate in political and security area was conspicuously absence in the founding document of the Association (The Bangkok Declaration). While it set out the task of promoting "regional peace and stability" and strengthening " the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian nations," the Bangkok Declaration clearly reflects the believe in "the economic road towards peace." Indeed, cooperation was only deemed necessary on "matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields." 2. As normative values, the quest for "peace, stability, and prosperity" will continue to be relevance as the main rationale for ASEAN's existence. For more than three decades, it has functioned well as the platform for the pursuit of intra-mural cooperation within a specific historical context. Changes in the strategic environment, and its attendant implications for regional security and domestic priorities, make it imperative for ASEAN to also acknowledge the importance of " security road towards peace." ASEAN can no longer pretend that " peace, stability , and prosperity" can only be achieved through economic cooperation. 3. The recognition of the importance of "security road towards peace, stability and prosperity" should now be incorporated formally into ASEAN rationale. True, ASEAN has never i1nended to transform itself into a defense community based on a collective defense approach to security. It is also true that ASEAN has never aspired to become an organization shaped by a collective security approach. In fact, for more than three decades, ASEAN has always avoided the need to define its objective beyond normative and abstract terms. If ASEAN wants to have a meaningful political and security cooperation, it needs to define the end condition that it wants to achieve in a more concrete form. In other words, ASEAN needs to agree on what it wants itself to evolve into and how to achieve it. 4. For that purpose, Indonesia should propose that ASEAN evolves into a "Security Community" within the next 20 years or so. The ideal of "peace and stability" embedded in the Bangkok Declaration needs operational and functional meaning. ASEAN can no longer be allowed to "float" without a sense of purpose; without a practical goal that needs to be achieve, without a future condition that needs to be realized. The idea of ASEAN Security Community is meant to provide such a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for. 5. This proposal will complement the proposal by Singapore that ASEAN evolves into an Economic Community by 2020. In the long term, a sustai11able economic community can only be guaranteed by the creation of a security community .Vice versa, a security community will not last without a strong foundation of mutual interests generated by economic community. In other words, the notion of an economic commw1ity and a security community is mutually reinforcing. Therefore, the idea of an ASEAN Community, in which economic integration and cooperative security are essentially linked, is not impossible to achieve. A. The Concept: Characteristics and the Reality of Contemporary ASEAN 1. The concept of Security Community is often defined as a group of states that has achieved a condition, as a result of flow of communication and the habit of cooperation, where members share "expectations of peaceful change" and rule out "the use of force as a means of problem solving." States that belong to a Security Community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to other states and then- destiny bound by common norms, history, political experience, and regional location. A Security Community exists when states reach the level of confidence that security can only be attained if they cooperate with each other. It is a regional grouping that has renounced the use of force as a means of resolving intra- regional conflicts. 2. Facilitated by high levels of political and economic interdependence, states within a Security Community come to build the "habit of trust" in managing their intra-mural affairs. A Security Community is also characterized by (a) the absence of a competitive military build-up among the regional actors, (b) total absence of armed inter-state conflict, (c) the presence of formal and informal n1stitutions and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts and disorder, (d) high degree of economic n1tegration, and (e) the absence of territorial dispute among member states. Unlike a "Security Regime," where the renouncement of the threat or use of force "is still inhibited by the existence of a balance of power or mutual deterrence situation," a Security Community is based on " a fundamental, unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among the actors in the avoidance of war ." 3. ASEAN, despite the potentials generated by the habit of cooperation over 35 years, is yet to develop into a fullpledged Security Community .Even though member states have renounced the threat or use of force as a means of resolving conflict among themselves, it is still a Security Regime. At this stage, the renounciation of the use of threat still a declaration of intent rather an objective condition- The transformation of ASEAN into a security community would require not only the absence of war but also the absence of the prospect of war. 4. If managed consciously, however, ASEAN could n1 fact develop, not into a pluralistic Security Community in a Deutschian sense, but into a comprehensive Security Community more attuned to the region's own needs and characteristics. While Deutschian concept of Security Community is based only on the notion of security in military terms, ASEAN stands a much better prospect to become a Security Community in a comprehensive sense: a Comprehensive Security Community that incorporates, and attach an equal importance to, elements of non-military security. It is also important to stress that a Security Community is not a Defense Pact or a military alliance. Security Community does not prescribe member states to commit their resources in defense of a member state in the event of a military attack from external actor. It seeks the creation of a conducive and cooperative environment within which conflict would not occur ill the first place. Even in the case of dispute, an ASEAN Security Community would provide a framework within which disputes can be prevented, managed, and resolved peacefully through other means than the military one. 5. Indeed, ASEAN is well placed to strive for the realization of such regional security community vision in the future. It already possesses elements of all the characteristics of a Security Community mentioned above. In fact, there have been formal and informal institutions and practices which serve to reduce, prevent, and manage col1flicts within ASEAN. In order to become a Security Community , in the future ASEAN only needs to strengthen its capability to prevent and resolve conflicts and disorder. Moreover, the basis for a deep economic integration is already provided for in the plan to create an ASEAN Economic Community .If the vision for an ASEAN Economic Community can be achieved within the agreed time-frame, there is strong reason to believe that an ASEAN Security Community is also more in the area of the possible rather than in the area of the probable. B. Principles and Instruments An " ASEAN Security Community" does not necessarily resemble that of the Security Community envisaged by North Atlantic countries. It is, after all, an ASEAN Security Community. Therefore, the idea for an ASEAN Security Community needs to be based on a set of principles sensitive to, and cognizant of, (a) historical and contemporary reality of the region, (b) aspirations and condition of member states, and (c) the strategic context within which ASEAN faces its own security challenges. The current principles embedded in ASEAN already provide the basis for such a Security Community. However, those principles also need to be adjusted to the current reality so that they will meet new challenges and requirements. Principle of Non-Interference. This principle should continue to become the main feature of an ASEAN Security Community .However, the governments of ASEAN countries should employ the principle in a flexible way. They should be: (1) more open to greater and cooperative involvement of other member states -through an agreed mechanism-- in trans-boundaries issues (internal issues with clear regional implications) and issues with identifiable humanitarian dimension (such as gross violations of human rights and in the event of humanitarian crisis); (2) more open to friendly advise offered by fellow member state, provided such advise is regulated and channeled through appropriate mechanism; and (3) less reactive to voices of civil society of other member states. Respect for National Sovereignty. An ASEAN Security Community will continue to place national sovereignty of member states as the highest principle that regulates intra-mural relations. Again, such as in the case of non-interference, sovereignty should be exercised in an appropriate way. Member countries should be allowed to develop a mechanism through which ASEAN countries, as an institution, could assist member state (s) in internal issues with clear external implications. The ability to work together to prevent seeds of conflict from becoming open and violent conflict, for example, should be improved. It is also equally important that ASEAN develops the capacity to undertake a peace-keeping role in internal conflict, provided such a role is based on the cosent by state concerned. Consensus-based Decision-Making. This principle, as ASEAN has demonstrated for more than three decades, proved to be a wise approach to decision-making. As effectiveness is increasingly becoming the main challenge for ASEAN, the use of this principle should be made selective. On issues of paramount important to the Association, such as membership, decision-making should continue to be based on this principle. ASEAN should begin delineate when consensus should be evoked, and when flexibility i11 decision-making could be allowed. The formula of ASEAN-X can be the basis of this mode of decision-making in the field of security cooperation. The " Anti- Terror Pact" between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, which Vietnam and Cambodia later joined, is an example of this. The Renouncement of the Threat or Use of Force. This principle, already included in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (T AC), should serve as the foundation for ASEAN Security Community. Disputes and conflicts among member states should be resolved through peaceful means. For this principle to become an embedded element intra-ASEAN relations, not just a declaration of intent, ASEAN should consciously work to transform its current status as a " conflict management" institution into a " conflict resolution" one. The Importance of Comprehensive Security. ASEAN, despite all the rhetoric, remains an inter-governmental form of cooperation among regional states. As such, the emphasis on "state security" over "human security" remains visible. An ASEAN with a state-centric paradigm will not be able to regain its relevance. An ASEAN Security Community should balance its concern over state security with a greater emphasis on "human security" and more room for people-to-people interaction. ASEAN's long subscription to the principle of comprehensive security , which conceives security beyond its military dimension, clearly provides the basis for this. For an ASEAN Security Community , security should encompass every aspects of life. The realization of An ASEAN Security Community can also rely on the existing instruments. The TAC, for example, already provides the basis for (a) the renouncement of war and the use of forces and (b) the mechanism to resolve conflict. The AFT A provides the basis for deeper economic integration, and this will be more so if ASEAN adopts a plan to transform itself into an ASEAN Economic Community .Meanwhile, the Declaration of ASEAN Concord provides the basis for a shared identity among member states. C. Areas of Cooperation In the long terms, an ASEAN Security Community should be a community capable of managing, countering and defeating threats to regional security and stability .Each member state should be able to cope with such threats at national level, and has the capacity and willingness to contribute to a common efforts at regional level. This requires member states to deepen and expand areas of political and security cooperation, both in traditional and non-traditional areas. Specifically, there are two areas that need special attention. First, there is a need for ASEAN to strengthen security and defense cooperation among member states. For example, ASEAN needs to strengthen the mechanism and capability to conduct a joint patrol and surveillance. Second, there is also a need to develop a capacity to assist member states in dealing with internal conflicts, especially in ensuring peace and in undertaking post-conflict reconstruction. An improvement in the ability to undertake peace-keeping operations is imperative. In the short and medium terms, especially in light of post-September 11 security challenges, ASEAN needs to deepen cooperation in political and security fields, especially in addressing non-traditional threats. In this regard, the need to tackle the growing threat of terrorism -in domestic, regional and global context-should be given a high priority by member states, especially those directly affected by the threat of terrorism. The initiative to combat terrorism should be undertaken in a comprehensive way which incorporates the need to protect both state and human security. D. Institution-Building An ASEAN Security Community needs a more integrated institution. Here, there is a need for ASEAN to wider the participation of defense establishments in its activities. An informal ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM) could also be considered. Exchange of views between foreign ministers and defense ministers on issues of common concerns should be encouraged. As it views security in comprehensive terms, ASEAN machiI1ery should reflect that notion. Cooperation in combating terrorism should be made central in ASEAN cooperation in addressing non-traditional threats. To achieve this, ASEAN should not approach terrorism as one part of larger transnational security issues. It should approach the problem in its own rights, together with other problems that facilitate acts of terrorism. In other words, problems such as small-arms trafficking, frauds and fake documents, illegal immigrants, and money laundering, should be tackled as parts of the overall efforts to combat terrorism. In this area of combating terrorism, the implementation of the agreement to improve institutional capacitybuilding among the member states has been slow. Moreover, the Yangon meeting has not detailed how the coordination and relationship between AMMTC and SOMTC and other relevant institutions should be undertaken. Here, ASEAN has decided to undertake a "two-pronged strategy" in combating terrorism: cooperation within an ASEAN framework and cooperation among ASEAN member states under the formula of " ASEAN-X." In practical term, the iI1itiative and cooperation in combating terrorism needs greater focus and coordination. Therefore, ASEAN should consider the establishment of an ASEAN Centre for Combating Terrorism, and urges its member states to ratify all relevant international conventions in this area. This later point is important due to the fact that there is a difficulty in harmonizing legal instruments in any ASEAN agreement to combat terrorism and other trans-national crimes. In order to improve its conflict prevention and conflict resolution capacity, ASEAN also needs to establish Peace- Keeping Training Centre . Such a centre could provide ASEAN member states a new vehicle to forge a more institutionalised mechanism for confidence-building measures (CBMS). In responding to growing trans-national threats and challenges, especially those with maritime dimension, an ASEAN Maritime Surveillance Centre might be needed. E. Platform for Security Cooperation: Towards A New Constitutional Framework All ideas raised above will not become a reality unless it is incorporated into a binding document that serves as a new road-map for ASEAN cooperation in political and security field. For that purpose, ASEAN should issue a new political and security platform, say a Bali Declaration on ASEAN Security Community, that i11corporates the following elements: a. a vision for an ASEAN Security Community b. commitment by ASEAN states to develop a security community by 2020, c. an agreement to request Indonesia, as Chairman of Standing Committee, to draft An ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action or ASEAN Comprehensive Regional Security Plan, to be submitted at the l0th ASEAN Summit. d. The needs for a new platform for political and security cooperation which combi11e relevant aspects of ZOPFAN, TAC, and SEANWFZ with new ones. Summary: Recommendations for Indonesia's Government in Preparation for the 9th ASEAN Summit I. Propose the idea of ASEAN Security Comn1unity by 2020, 2. Propose to i11tegrate the existing ASEAN pri11ciples as the basis for an ASEAN Security Community , 3. Propose the adoption of a new ASEAN Community constitution, be it in the form of a new declaration such as Bali Declaration on ASEAN Security Community or an ASEAN Declaration on Comprehensive Security Cooperation, 4. Endorse the proposal for an ASEAN Centre for Combating Terrorism, ASEAN Peace Keeping Trai11i11g Centre, and ASEAN Maritime Surveillance Centre
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